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Nationally distributed medications from compounding 
pharmacies, which typically adhere to less stringent quality-
control standards than pharmaceutical manufacturers, can 
lead to multistate outbreaks. We investigated a cluster of 
6 patients in a Maryland hospital who had Sphingomonas 
paucimobilis bloodstream infections in November 2007. Of 
the 6 case-patients, 5 (83%) had received intravenous fen-
tanyl within 48 hours before bacteremia developed. Cultures 
of unopened samples of fentanyl grew S. paucimobilis; the 
pulsed-ﬁ  eld gel electrophoresis pattern was indistinguish-
able from that of the isolates of 5 case-patients. The con-
taminated fentanyl lot had been prepared at a compound-
ing pharmacy and distributed to 4 states. Subsequently, in 
California, S. paucimobilis bacteremia was diagnosed for 
2 patients who had received intravenous fentanyl from the 
same compounding pharmacy. These pharmacies should 
adopt more stringent quality-control measures, including 
prerelease product testing, when compounding and distrib-
uting large quantities of sterile preparations.
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Upon completion of this activity, participants will be able to:
Describe the types of bacterial contamination associated with different compounding pharmacy medications. • 
Describe the features of  •  Sphingomonas paucimobilis bacteria.
Identify the types of exposure associated with transmission of  •  S. paucimobilis infection with contaminated fentanyl.
Describe a strategy that would limit the occurrence of compounding pharmacy product contamination. • 
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ompounding pharmacies are licensed or registered 
by state pharmacy boards to combine “reasonable 
quantities” of ingredients to ﬁ  ll a valid prescription from 
a licensed practitioner for an individual patient (1). Some 
pharmacies, however, have moved beyond this role and, 
in anticipation of receiving routine orders, prepare larger 
quantities of compounded preparations for national dis-
tribution to healthcare facilities (2,3). Nationally distrib-
uted medications from compounding pharmacies, which 
typically adhere to less stringent quality-control standards 
than pharmaceutical manufacturers, can lead to multi-
state outbreaks that may be difﬁ  cult to detect. Sunenshine 
et al. recently reported a 5-state outbreak of Serratia 
marcescens bloodstream infections associated with con-
taminated intravenous magnesium sulfate from a com-
pounding pharmacy (3). Other reported outbreaks caused 
by contaminated medications from compounding phar-
macies include the following: S. marcescens infections 
associated with betamethasone injection, Pseudomonas 
putida septicemia caused by use of contaminated ﬂ  ush 
solutions in a special-care nursery, Burkholderia cepacia 
infections caused by contaminated intravenous ﬂ  ush so-
lutions, Pseudomonas ﬂ  uorescens bloodstream infections 
associated with a heparin/saline ﬂ  ush, and Exophiala der-
matitidis infections caused by injection of contaminated 
steroids (4–10; Table 1).
Sphingomonas paucimobilis is an aerobic bacterium 
found in soil and water; it is a rare cause of healthcare-
associated infections (11,12). S. paucimobilis has been re-
ported to cause outbreaks of bacteremia among immuno-
compromised patients in hematology and oncology units; 
these outbreaks are possibly related to bacterial coloniza-
tion of hospital water systems (13,14). An S. paucimobilis 
outbreak in mechanically ventilated neonates was linked 
to contaminated temperature probes (15). In November 
2007, The Johns Hopkins Hospital Department of Hospital 
Epidemiology and Infection Control initiated an outbreak 
investigation after being notiﬁ  ed by the hospital’s microbi-
ology laboratory of the growth of S. paucimobilis in several 
patients’ blood cultures over a 2-week period.
Methods
The Johns Hopkins Hospital is a 926-bed, tertiary-
care, academic hospital in Baltimore, Maryland, USA. 
For this investigation, we deﬁ  ned a case-patient as any 
patient in our hospital whose cultures of blood or of other 
normally sterile body sites grew S. paucimobilis in No-
vember 2007. S. paucimobilis isolates were characterized 
as gram-negative rods that are yellow-pigmented, glucose 
nonfermenting, and weakly oxidase positive; they were 
preliminarily identiﬁ  ed by the BD Phoenix Automated 
Microbiology System (BD Diagnostics, Inc. Sparks, MD, 
USA). All S. paucimobilis isolates were conﬁ  rmed by cell 
wall fatty acid analysis using gas liquid chromatography 
(Sherlock Microbial Identiﬁ  cation System version 4.5, li-
brary 5.0; MIDI, Inc. Newark, DE, USA). Microbiology 
records from January 2006 through November 2007 were 
examined to identify case-patients and to establish the 
baseline rate of S. paucimobilis bacteremia. We identiﬁ  ed 
common exposures for case-patients and focused on in-
travenous infusions, medications, and contrast agents and 
on case-patients’ clinical signs, treatments, and outcomes. 
Because most of the blood cultures growing S. paucimo-
bilis were collected in BacT/Alert FA bottles containing 
activated charcoal (bioMérieux, Durham, NC, USA), we 
cultured noninoculated bottles from clinical units by plac-
ing them directly into the blood culture instrument to as-
sess for intrinsic contamination. On the basis of informa-
tion from the medical record review, samples for bacterial 
culture were taken from 4 implicated lots of intravenous 
fentanyl mixed in 0.9% sodium chloride solution. All 4 
lots came from an out-of-state compounding pharmacy, 
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Table 1. Recently published reports of infectious outbreaks associated with contaminated medications prepared at compounding 
pharmacies, United States, 2002–2007 
Reference Organism  Infection (no. patients) Mode of transmission  Location of outbreak 
 (3) Serratia marcescens Bloodstream infections (18)  Intravenous magnesium sulfate  California, New Jersey, 
North Carolina, New 
York, Massachusetts 
 (4) S. marcescens Meningitis, epidural abscess, 
or joint infection (11)* 
Epidural or intra-articular injection 
of betamethasone 
California
 (6) Burkholderia cepacia Bloodstream infections and 
sepsis (2 pediatric patients) 
Intravenous antibiotic-lock flush 
solution
Connecticut
 (7) Hepatitis C virus  Acute hepatitis C (16) Injected radiopharmaceutical for 
myocardial perfusion study 
3 clinics in Maryland 
 (8,10) Pseudomonas 
fluorescens
Bloodstream infections (64)  Heparin/saline intravenous flush  Missouri, New York, 
Texas, Michigan, South 
Dakota
 (9) Exophiala dermatitidis Meningitis (5)†  Epidural injection of 
methylprednisolone‡ 
2 pain management 
clinics in North Carolina 
*3 case-patients died. 
†1 case-patient died. 
‡Prepared by a compounding pharmacy in South Carolina and supplied to hospitals and clinics in 5 states. RESEARCH
hereafter called pharmacy A. All S. paucimobilis iso-
lates were strain typed by pulsed-ﬁ  eld gel electrophoresis 
(PFGE) after digestion with XbaI using standard methods 
and interpreted according to criteria established by Ten-
over et al. (16).
We investigated the possibility that fentanyl had been 
tampered with or diverted by tracing the narcotic chain of 
custody, reviewing controlled substance procedures, visu-
ally inspecting fentanyl bags for signs of tampering, test-
ing fentanyl concentrations, and analyzing personnel ac-
cess records from the automated medication management 
system (Pyxis, Cardinal Health; www.cardinal.com/us/
en/providers/products/pyxis/index.asp). The investigation 
was coordinated with public health authorities, including 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and 
the Baltimore City Health Department. CDC performed a 
multistate case-ﬁ  nding investigation by working with the 
compounding pharmacy to trace the distribution of impli-
cated lots of intravenous fentanyl and by asking recipient 
healthcare institutions whether they had identiﬁ  ed cases of 
S. paucimobilis bacteremia. We notiﬁ  ed the US Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) of our ﬁ  ndings, and the FDA 
investigated compounding practices at pharmacy A. The 
Johns Hopkins University Institutional Review Board ap-
proved this study and waived informed consent.
Results
S. paucimobilis was isolated from the blood cultures of 
6 patients; the samples were collected from November 11 
through November 23, 2007. The organism was not isolated 
from cultures of any other body site. Case-patients had var-
ious underlying medical conditions and had been admitted 
to different hospital units: neurologic intensive care unit (3 
patients), medical intensive care unit (1 patient), oncology 
center (1 patient), and medicine unit (1 patient) (Table 2). 
S. paucimobilis grew in multiple sets of blood cultures (5 
patients) and from blood cultures collected on >1 date (3 
patients). In the preceding 22 months, S. paucimobilis had 
been isolated from blood cultures of 4 patients (Figure 1). 
As a result of S. paucimobilis bloodstream infections, 5 of 
the case-patients reported here received antimicrobial drug 
treatment and had central intravenous catheters or implant-
ed medication ports removed and replaced. One of these 
patients had an adverse reaction (rash and renal insufﬁ  cien-
cy) to antimicrobial drug treatment. All 5 patients treated 
with antimicrobial agents became free of S. paucimobilis 
bloodstream infection and survived. One patient (patient 5, 
Table 2) died of group A streptococcal sepsis before blood 
culture results for S. paucimobilis were available.
No breaches of infection control procedures or inap-
propriate blood culture practices were identiﬁ  ed. Blood for 
culture was collected by staff in each unit rather than by 
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Table 2. Demographic and clinical characteristics of patients with Sphingomonas paucimobilis bloodstream infection, United States, 
2007*
Patient no./ 
age, y/gender 
Hospital unit 
(US state)  Clinical diagnosis 
Date(s) of fentanyl 
administration†
Date(s) of 
infection Treatment Outcome
PFGE 
strain‡
1/65/M Medicine
(MD)
Osteomyelitis; MRSA 
wound infection 
NA Nov 14  ADT, central line 
removed and replaced 
Survived Unique
2/64/M NCCU (MD)  Subarachnoid
hemorrhage 
Oct 29–31, 
Nov 2–3, 
Nov 11–22 
Nov 14, 
Nov 18 
ADT, central line 
removed and replaced 
Survived A
3/46/F NCCU (MD)  Subarachnoid
hemorrhage 
Nov 10–11 
Nov 16–18 
Nov 11 
Nov 17 
Nov 19 
ADT, central line 
removed and replaced 
Survived A
4/69/F NCCU (MD)  Subarachnoid
hemorrhage 
Nov 18  Nov 18  ADT, central line 
removed and replaced 
Survived A
5/38/F MICU (MD)  Group A 
streptococcal sepsis 
Nov 16  Nov 16  ADT§ Died A
6/38/M Oncology 
(MD)
Head and neck tumor Nov 20,  
Nov 26 
Nov 20,
Nov 23 
ADT, implanted 
medication port 
removed and replaced 
Survived A
7/38/M SICU (CA)  Temporal lobe 
hemorrhage 
Oct 29  Oct 29  ADT Survived NA¶
8/59/M SICU (CA)  Entero-cutaneous 
fistula; aorto-
bifemoral bypass 
surgery 
Nov 8  Nov 8  ADT Survived NA¶
*All infections (except in patient 1) developed after administration of intravenous fentanyl compounded at an out-of-state pharmacy; MD, Maryland; CA, 
California; NCCU, neurologic critical care unit; MICU, medical intensive care unit; SICU, surgical intensive care unit; NA, not applicable; ADT, 
antimicrobial drug therapy; MRSA, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus; PFGE, pulsed-field gel electrophoresis. 
†Intravenous fentanyl in 0.9% sodium chloride solution from a 250-mL (10 Pg/mL) bag prepared at compounding pharmacy A. 
‡Strain A is the outbreak strain that was indistinguishable by PFGE from the fentanyl isolates. 
§The patient died of Group A streptococcal sepsis before the blood culture results for S. paucimobilis became available. 
¶Isolates from patients 7 and 8 in the California hospital were not available for strain typing. Sphingomonas paucimobilis Bloodstream Infections
a central vascular access team. No growth occurred from 
cultures of 50 noninoculated activated charcoal blood cul-
ture bottles; this ﬁ  nding was therefore not consistent with 
a pseudo-outbreak or intrinsic contamination of the bottles. 
Pharmacy records showed that 5 (83%) of 6 case-patients 
had received at least 1 intravenous dose of fentanyl (10 μg/
mL in 250 mL 0.9% sodium chloride) within the 48 hours 
before  S.  paucimobilis bacteremia developed. No other 
common exposure was identiﬁ  ed. We found that our hos-
pital had outsourced preparation of 250-mL fentanyl bags 
to pharmacy A, which shipped several lots to the hospital 
every 2 weeks.
Cultures of unopened samples from 1 implicated fen-
tanyl lot grew S. paucimobilis that had a PFGE pattern in-
distinguishable from that of the isolates of the 5 patients 
who had received intravenous fentanyl (Figure 2). A sixth 
case-patient (patient 1; Table 2), who did not receive intra-
venous fentanyl, had S. paucimobilis with a unique PFGE 
pattern. Of 26 unopened bags from the implicated lot of 
fentanyl that were cultured, 16 (62%) grew S. paucimobilis. 
Cultures of 9 samples from 3 other fentanyl lots in use dur-
ing the outbreak period produced no growth.
CDC’s multistate case-ﬁ   nding investigation deter-
mined that pharmacy A had distributed the contaminated 
fentanyl lot to 4 hospitals in different states. A California 
hospital that had received the implicated lot subsequently 
identiﬁ  ed 2 additional case-patients who had S. paucimobi-
lis bacteremia after administration of intravenous fentanyl 
from pharmacy A (Table 2). After diagnosis of bacteremia, 
these 2 case-patients received treatment with appropriate 
antimicrobial drugs without removal of existing central 
lines and were subsequently discharged from the hospital 
without complications from the bacteremia. At the Califor-
nia hospital, no unopened bags of the implicated fentanyl 
lot were available for culture, and the bloodstream isolates 
were not available for PFGE analysis. Speciﬁ  c lot numbers 
of fentanyl administered to patients were not available at 
either hospital. The 2 other hospitals that had received the 
implicated fentanyl lot did not detect any case-patients. 
The outbreak ended after the implicated fentanyl lot was 
removed from clinical areas. All bags of the implicated lot 
that could be located were tested for sterility at The Johns 
Hopkins Hospital and CDC before being discarded. The 
rest of the lot had either been used or was expired and de-
stroyed. No product was recalled by pharmacy A.
Investigation found no evidence of tampering with 
or diversion of fentanyl within the Maryland hospital. We 
found stringent procedures in place to document and se-
cure the narcotic chain of custody. No signs of tampering 
were visible on implicated bags of fentanyl that later grew 
S. paucimobilis, and the bags contained the expected con-
centration of fentanyl. We found that it was possible, al-
though difﬁ  cult, to remove and replace safety seals on the 
bags, which potentially could allow diversion of fentanyl 
without visible signs of tampering. Analysis of personnel 
access records from the automated medication and supply 
management system (Pyxis, Cardinal Health) did not iden-
tify any 1 person who had accessed >1 of the machines 
where the fentanyl was stored in the 4 hospital units with 
case-patients.
These 250-mL bags of intravenous fentanyl in 0.9% 
sodium chloride solution (10 μg/mL) are currently avail-
able only from pharmacy A and 1 other out-of-state com-
pounding pharmacy. This preparation is the most fre-
quently used at our institution and is not available from 
any pharmaceutical manufacturer. Because commercially 
available opioid alternatives at the desired concentration 
are not available, and to avoid disruption of patient care, 
our hospital continued to purchase the compounded prepa-
ration from pharmacy A. For 3 months after the outbreak, 
our microbiology laboratory performed sterility testing by 
culturing samples from each fentanyl lot received. None of 
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Figure 1. Epidemiologic curve showing the number of patients with Sphingomonas paucimobilis bacteremia at The Johns Hopkins Hospital, 
Baltimore, Maryland, USA, January 2006 through March 2008.RESEARCH
these samples grew any bacterial or fungal pathogens. We 
do not have access to the results of FDA’s investigation 
into compounding practices at pharmacy A.
Discussion
We describe a multistate outbreak of S. paucimobilis 
bacteremia that was associated with contaminated intra-
venous fentanyl prepared at an out-of-state compounding 
pharmacy. Astute observation by microbiology laboratory 
staff, good communication, and swift implementation of 
an epidemiologic investigation led to expeditious charac-
terization of the source of the infections and termination 
of the outbreak. Pharmacy A prepares large quantities of 
compounded pharmaceutical preparations and distributes 
them to many states in anticipation of orders. In contrast 
to pharmaceutical manufacturers, traditional compounding 
pharmacies are not routinely inspected by FDA to ensure 
that they have the capacity to consistently produce high-
quality drugs. In response to other infectious outbreak inci-
dents, the FDA has warned compounding pharmacies that 
the high-volume production of pharmaceutical prepara-
tions in response to bulk orders constitutes manufacturing 
and is inconsistent with traditional pharmacy compounding 
(17,18). Current good manufacturing practice regulations, 
as deﬁ  ned by FDA, require end-product sterility testing, 
among other stringent controls, when sterile pharmaceuti-
cal products are manufactured (19). Although traditional 
pharmacy compounding ﬁ   lls a commercial void when 
FDA-approved, commercially available drugs cannot meet 
patients’ medical needs, the lack of end-product sterility 
testing and other standards of good manufacturing practice 
is a serious potential threat to patient safety when com-
pounding pharmacies produce and distribute large quan-
tities of sterile pharmaceutical preparations. Multistate 
distribution of compounded preparations makes outbreaks 
and clusters of infections even more difﬁ  cult to detect and 
manage.
In 2001, as a result of a dispute over advertising re-
strictions, the Supreme Court ruled that the compounding 
provisions of the FDA Modernization Act of 1997 were 
unconstitutional (20–22). In 2002, the FDA issued guid-
ance to clarify the FDA’s position on pharmaceutical 
compounding; the guidance identiﬁ  ed factors that are con-
sidered in deciding whether to initiate enforcement action 
with respect to compounding (1). FDA historically has not 
taken enforcement actions against pharmacies engaged in 
traditional pharmacy compounding, but it has directed its 
enforcement against establishments whose activities are 
normally associated with a drug manufacturer. However, 
much of the investigation, regulation, and enforcement of 
compounding falls to state licensing boards (2,18). The 
American Society of Health-System Pharmacists (ASHP), 
the United States Pharmacopeia (USP), and the National 
Association of Boards of Pharmacy have issued practice 
and quality assurance guidelines for sterile compound-
ing of pharmaceutical preparations (23,24). In 2004, USP 
chapter 797 put forth a set of enforceable standards for 
the compounding of sterile preparations (25); recently re-
vised standards took effect on June 1, 2008 (24). These 
standards do not require end-product sterility testing for 
most compounded preparations (24). Some states require 
compounding pharmacies to comply with USP 797 and 
ASHP standards; however, a national survey found that 
many pharmacies are not fully compliant with ASHP qual-
ity assurance guidelines (26), and a 2006 survey docu-
mented incomplete awareness and implementation of USP 
797 standards (27). From 1990 through 2002, the FDA 
received reports of >55 quality problems associated with 
compounded preparations (28); Table 1 shows reports of 
6 such incidents published since 2002. An FDA survey in 
2001 found 34% of tested preparations from compound-
ing pharmacies failed to meet analytic testing standards, 
although none failed sterility tests (28).
Our investigation had limitations. Neither hospital 
could trace the lot numbers administered to each patient, so 
we could neither conﬁ  rm which patients received contami-
nated lots of fentanyl nor assess an attack rate for receipt of 
the contaminated lots. We did not conduct a case–control 
study to calculate an odds ratio for administration of fen-
tanyl being the primary risk factor for infection. Isolates 
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Figure 2. Results of pulsed-ﬁ   eld gel electrophoresis (PFGE) of 
Sphingomonas paucimobilis isolates obtained in November 2007. 
Lanes 1 and 10, molecular weight marker; lanes 2–7, bloodstream 
isolates from patients 1–6, respectively; lane 8, isolate from 
contaminated fentanyl; lane 9, unrelated control isolate. Patients 2 
through 6 received intravenous fentanyl within 48 hours before S. 
paucimobilis bacteremia developed and had isolates with a PFGE 
pattern indistinguishable from that of fentanyl isolates. Patient 1 
did not receive intravenous fentanyl and had S. paucimobilis 
bacteremia with a distinct PFGE pattern. Sphingomonas paucimobilis Bloodstream Infections
from California case-patients were not available for strain 
typing. Finally, we do not have access to FDA’s investiga-
tional ﬁ  ndings regarding pharmacy A, which might indicate 
the source of the contamination. Despite these limitations, 
the available evidence strongly suggests that contaminated 
fentanyl from pharmacy A was the source of this multistate 
outbreak of S. paucimobilis bloodstream infections.
FDA continues to face many serious and complex chal-
lenges (29,30). Our investigation, along with other similar 
published reports, indicates that the issue of large-scale 
pharmaceutical production and distribution by compound-
ing pharmacies is also an urgent concern that requires at-
tention. Pharmacies that compound and distribute large 
quantities of sterile pharmaceutical preparations without 
prescriptions for individual patients should be considered 
manufacturers and should be required to follow good manu-
facturing practices, including end-product sterility testing.
Until stricter regulations are imposed and enforced, 
hospital pharmacists and administrators must be cautious 
when outsourcing compounded pharmaceutical prepara-
tions and should consider the possibility of contaminated 
sterile pharmaceutical products when unusual organisms or 
patterns of disease are detected. Hospital personnel may be 
unaware that preparation of pharmaceutical products has 
been outsourced to a compounding pharmacy (3) and may 
not recognize the different regulatory requirements and po-
tential implications of this decision. Healthcare facilities 
should strongly consider recording lot numbers of com-
pounded medications administered to individual patients 
because this would aid investigations. Increased outsourc-
ing of compounded pharmaceutical preparations makes 
surveillance for unexpected untoward events increasingly 
important. Compounding pharmacies should adhere to the 
standards set forth in USP 797 and should adopt more strin-
gent quality control measures, including prerelease product 
testing, when preparing and distributing large quantities of 
sterile preparations.
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